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SATELLITE COMMUNICATION NETWORK CONTROL IN THE
PRESENCE OF ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES

Marc Spellman
Harris Government Satellite Communications Division
Melbourne, Florida

nonmilitary and military satellite
communications network the control system
rationale and requirements are presented. The
control system is then subdivided into its
component subsystems and qualitative
requirements are provided for the subsystems.

ABSTRACT

Satellite communications networks have
supplanted other over-the-horizon
communications systems because of their high
capacity and high reliability. A key
characteristic of satellite communications
systems is that all communication links within a
network share a common transponder and thus have
the potential for deleterious interactions.
This in turn gives rise to the need for a
network control function that can establish and
ensure appropriate transmission characteristics
for each terminal with the goal of maximizing
the communications capacity available to all
network members.

Following this the strategies that are
available to both the jammer and the
communicator are discussed with respect to the
operation and design of the control system.
To put all this in perspective the paper
concludes with a typical flow of events that
could successfully transition the network in
response to a changing ECM environment.
Control System Rationale and Requirements

Because of the potential for electronic
countermeasures in military satellite
communications systems, an antijam mode of
operations, which by its very nature is a
reduced capacity mode, is often included in the
network architecture. This in turn puts added
burdens on the control function for the network.
Both a clear mode of operation and an antijam
mode of operation (often with different
properties and characteristics) must be
controlled and, furthermore, a timely mechanism
for transitioning between the two modes must be
provided.

Briefly stated, the fundamental purpose for a
satellite network control system is to allocate
satellite resources in some optimum manner.
The satellite resources to be allocated are the
downlink EIRP and bandwidth and the allocations
must be made to each SATCOM terminal
participating in the network. The allocations
take the form of designations on the uplink
signal parameters for each SATCOM terminal.

INTRODUCTION

From the network control point of view an
optimum allocation is one where the capacity
available for reliable information transfer
through the satellite is maximized for each
user. Given that there is an upper system
capacity based on the satellite transponder and
earth terminal designs, it is the function of
the network control system to determine
allocations that result in a total operating
capacity that approaches the maximum system
capacity available from the equipment while
maintaining an acceptable level of link
availability. To do this it must minimize
wasted capacity and it must assure that the
transmissions from network participants do not
interfere and thus reduce system capacity.

In this paper the satellite network control
system is examined first. For both a

How the control system both reduces wasted
capacity and assures that network participants

In this paper the generic top level requirements
are defined for a military satellite
communications control system. The control
system function is then divided into its key
components and generic requirements are provided
for each component. Alternative strategies for
both communicator and jammer are discussed
leading to the flow of events that would result
in the transitioning of the SATCOM network in
response to a changing ECM environment.
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do not interfere with each other depends on the
method by which the satellite resources are
shared between the user SATCOM terminals. The
method of sharing which is generally called the
multiple access technique determines what
parameters of the uplink transmissions must be
controlled and based on the particulars of the
specific network, how accurately they must be
controlled.

Time division multiple access systems assign a
time slot in a master time frame to each earth
terminal participating in the network. In the
assigned time slot the earth terminal has
exclusive use of the entire transponder
bandwidth and power. The earth terminal
operates in a burst mode with a symbol rate
consistent with the transponder bandwidth.
With respect to the control requirements, the
time of transmission for each earth station
must be carefully controlled since transmissions
overlapping in time will obliterate each other
and transmissions not fully occupying an
assigned time slot mean wasted capacity.
However, the power control problem of FDMA no
longer exists since only one user is present in
the transponder at any instant of time. The
power control requirement is reduced to ensuring
that a constant minimum EIRP, enough to
saturate the transponder, is always exceeded.
The value is independent of the transmitting
terminal characteristics, the information rate
being transmitted from the terminal and the
number of terminals in the network.

There are three principal multiple access
techniques; frequency division multiple access
(FDMA), time division multiple access (TDMA)
and code division multiple access (COMA).
There is no intent in this paper to compare the
virtues or shortcomings of each but since the
control system requirements are related to the
multiple access technique, a brief
consideration of the three approaches is
warranted.
U3
U2
U1

Code division multiple access systems separate
user signals not in time or frequency but with
an additional signal modulation. An orthogonal
PN code is phase or frequency modulated on each
of the user uplinks, allowing a receiver with a
matched replica code to receive the desired
signal without interference from the other
transmissions in the network. COMA has the
characteristic of multiple simultaneous users
in the transponder as does FDMA, so excess
margin on any link equates to reduced capacity
for other users. The power control problem
with respect to intermodulation interference,
however, is not as severe because of the
interference reduction properties of the signal
structure. Like TDMA, there is a timing
accuracy requirement; however, in CDMA it is on
a link-by-link basis (receiver and transmitter
for each link) rather than on a network-wide
basis .

FDMA ALL USERS ARE ON ALL THE TIME
BUT ARE SEPARATED IN FREQUENCY

U3
U2
U1

TDMA ALL USERS ARE ON AT DIFFERENT TIMES
BUT WHEN ON UTILIZE THE ENTIRE
AVAILABLE BANDWIDTH

U3

U3

- U2

U2

U1

COMA ALL USERS ON ALL THE TIME AND EACH
USES THE ENTIRE BANDWIDTH

Figure "I.
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Multiple Access Techniques
Of the signal parameters mentioned above, the
control of frequency and time are rather
mundane. That is not to say either is an easy
engineering problem, but it is the control and
selection of earth terminal EIRP and bandwidth
that is really at the heart of the network
control function. These earth terminal
parameters specifically determine the satellite
allocations.

Frequency division multiple access assigns a
portion of the transponder bandwidth to each
network participant. The channel spacings on
the uplinks are determined by the instantaneous
bandwidth of the uplink transmissions and the
required frequency guard bands as determined by
the filtering characteristics in the earth
terminals. From a control point of view it is
obvious that uplink frequency assignments must
be adhered to in order to avoid interference
between users. In addition, since in an FDMA
system all users are simultaneously present in
the transponder, the uplink power for each user
must be carefully controlled. This is
necessary so that both potential
intermodulation interference and power lost to
intermods (due to nonlinearities in the
satellite transponder) are avoided, and that
potential user capacity is not lost to
excessive link margins.

Based on the above, one can formulate two key
types of quantitative requirements that can be
placed on a satellite network control system.
The first is to maintain no greater than some
stated link margin on every link in the
network. This is a legitimate requirement
since, while link margin is fine for the
particular link (because it assures a greater
availability of the link), it isn't fine for
other network members or potential members.
Excessive link margin reduces the capacity
3-2

available to all other users and potential
users. The second requirement is a maximum
acceptable response time in which the control
system must correct a deviation from the
designated link margin on any link in the
network. This requirement would seem naturally
to be a function of both the polarity and
magnitude of the deviation as well as on the
particular link experiencing the deviation.
For example, a negative deviation from a
prescribed link margin means a statistically
less available link and therefore a short
response time would appear appropriate. On the
other hand a positive deviation from link
. margin which means a loss of potential network
capacity might require a response time
inversely related to the amount of lost
capacity. Thus, for a given deviation (in
dB's) longer response times might be acceptable
for lower capacity links than for higher
capacity links. Similarly, for a link of given
capacity the greater the deviation the shorter
the required response time.

the control process. Monitoring addresses the
analysis of the downlink from the satellite.
It is the information gathering process on
which to base allocation decisions regarding
the network participants. The allocation
subfunction determines the key uplink signal
parameters of EIRP, bit rate and, "if
applicable, an antijam or clear operating mode
for each of the SATCOM terminals in the
network. The communication subfunction has the
responsibility of communicating the allocation
decisions made by the control system to each of
the SATCOM terminals. This is pictorially
shown in Figure 2.
MONITORING
RECEIVE SATELLITE
DOWNLINK SIGNAL
PROCESSING TO DETERMINE
CHARACTERISTICS

ALLOCATION
COMPUTATIONS BASED ON
RECEIVED MONITORING
INFORMATION AND STORED
DATA BASE

"Control system requirements center about
maintaining no greater than some stated link
margin on every li/fk in the network."

Figure 2.
This fundamental issue of link availability
versus network capacity takes on an entirely
new dimension in a military satellite
communications network. In this paper a
military satellite communications network will
be/distinguished from a nonmilitary network
srolely by its potential to be a target for
electronic countermeasures. As a target for
ECM the well designed military communications
system must include for each of its links an
antijam or ECCM mode of operation. But such a
mode by its very nature is a reduced capacity
mode since it either uses power or bandwidth or
both far in excess of what is necessary for
information transfer in order to defeat the
potential jammer. Therefore the tradeoff
between link availability and system capacity
is greatly magnified. If one initiates an
antijam mode of operation too early there is a
significant loss of capacity. If one initiates
an antijam mode of operation too late there is
no link availability. This substantiates the
need for a timely mechanism for transitioning
between modes. Complicating the situation
further is the fact that with a jammer
attacking the satellite transponder there is a
definite question as to the capacity available
to the network. Allocations must then be made
in an environment far different than in the
nonmilitary network situation which is
characterized by a much more accurate data base.

CONTROL TERMINAL

The Control Process

"The three subfunctions that comprise the
control process are monitoring, allocation, and
communication."
In attempting to develop some generic
requirements for each of the three subsystems,
the initial considerations go to apportioning
the control system response time and maximum
allowable link margin requirements to each' of
the subsystems. With respect to response time,
a portion of the total budget must be ascribed
to each of the three subsystems. A finite time
is necessary to process the received satellite
downlink and determine the appropriate received
signal characteristics. Similarly, time is
necessary to complete the allocation process
which is a calculation intensive task based
upon a stored data base and the monitoring
results. Finally, the communication
subfunction needs a time allocation that must
consider the limited data rate likely for
control communications as well as the need to
communicate possibly a different message to
each of the earth terminals in the network.
The requirement for a maximum allowable link
margin on each link in the network will impact
the monitoring subsystem and the allocation
subsystem. The monitoring subsystem is
impacted because it has the requirement for
gathering the data on which an estimate of
existing link margin will be made. The
allocation subsystem is impacted because it
must include the calculation capability that
makes the link margin estimate as well as
relate the required change in earth terminal
uplink parameters to the desired change in link
margin.

Subsystem Definition
The control function can be divided into three
separate subfunctions, each defining a related
subsystem to perform an appropriate task. The
three subfunctions are monitoring, allocation
and communications and together they constitute
3-3

communications capacity of the network by
reducing link margins to the greatest degree
possible. This desire is predicated by the
reality that most military satellite
communication networks rarely if ever operate
in an environment characterized by a determined
jammer and therefore typically operate like
nonmilitary networks. The antijam mode of
operations on the other hand is characterized
by an extremely significant reduction in the
available capacity in order to assure a
communications capability even in the face of
the most determined jammer. This approach is
justified since the scenarios that give rise to
determined jammers are precisely those where
link availability becomes most essential.

More can be said about the requirements for
each of the subsystems in the cases of both a
nonmilitary and a military satellite network
control system. For the monitoring subsystem,
the basic requirement is the accuracy to which
downlink signal power can be measured. With
respect to the measurement of downlink power,
an output from the monitoring subsystem that
can support a decision on whether or not the
satellite transponder is saturated is an
important monitoring subsystem requirement.
When, as in the case of a military system, the
potential for jamming is introduced, an
immediate additional requirement should be
placed on the monitoring subsystem and that is
to support jammer identification and
characterization. The first step in that
process is to be able to distinguish the
effects of an equipment failure from the
effects of a jammer. Once that can be
accomplished additional jammer characterization
requirements, such as determining if the jammer
is time varying or stationary in time, if the
jammer is an uplink jammer or a downlink
jammer, and what frequency channels the jammer
is attacking, are all legitimate requirements.

"The prime consideration in selecting the
network architecture is the fundamental
tradeoff of the availability of a link versus
the potential capacity of the entire network. 11
There are some alternative network structures
as shown in Figure 3 and therefore strategies
to effectively provide both operating modes.
One approach is to use the same modem equipment
to provide both the clear and the AJ operating
modes and adjust operating parameters of the
equipment to transition between modes as a
result of control system directives. This
naturally is not as easy as it sounds, since it
puts the full transition burden on the control
system; but it does have the advantage, if the,
transition can be done smoothly, of matching the
right mode to the right scenario.

The allocation subsystem is also significantly
more complex for the military network than for
the nonmilitary network. First, anytime a
jammer is introduced the potential for a
continually time varying network status is a
real situation. The allocation subsystem must
be able to react quickly and, even more
important, must know when not to react at all.
In addition, the jammer introduces a degree of
uncertainty as to the available capacity left
for the network, thus further complicating the
allocation process.
Finally, with respect to the communications
subsystem, the military SATCOM control system
must provide a degree of antijam protection for
the control link at least equivalent to that of
the communications links that must be
controlled. This will ensure a control
capability at all times when the communications
links are operable.

CONFIGURATION 1

DUAL MODE
MODEM

4——>

TRANSMIT/
RECEIVE

C

«—————H

CONFIGURATION 2
APPROACH A: SWITCH MODEM PARAMETERS BASED
ON THE DETECTION OF JAMMING
APPROACH B: SWITCH MODEM PARAMETERS BASED ON
THE POTENTIAL FOR NEAR TERM JAMMING

Strategies for Communicators and Jammers
The strategies for the communicator in a
military satellite network center first about
the alternatives available from which the
network architecture can be selected and second
about the various possible responses to the
onset of jamming.

Figure 3.

Alternate Architectures

An alternate approach that greatly reduces the
burden on the control system is to transition
the network between modes, not as a result of a
reaction to jamming as determined by the
network control system, but rather as a
reaction to the potential for future jamming as
determined by an assessment of the political
and military situation. The penality paid here
is the lost capacity either prior to the onset
of jamming or if the jamming never occurs.

The prime consideration in selecting the
network architecture is again the fundamental
tradeoff of the availability of a particular
link versus the potential capacity of the
entire satellite network. It is apparent that
there are two different operating modes for the
military SATCOM network, a clear mode and an
antijam mode. The clear mode of operations is
characterized by the desire to maximize the

Still another approach is feasible if separate
modem equipment is used to provide the clear
3-4

and the A3 operating modes. This wouldandallow
the
simultaneous operation of both the A3 would
clear mode of operation. The approach
proceed with the few most critical channels
assigned to the A3 mode of operation and all
the other channels assigned to the clear mode
of operation. The capacity of the network
would only be slightly degraded due to
self-interference between modes. Theface of a
availability of the A3 links in the
be if
jammer, while not as great as it would allocated
the bulk of the terminal EIRP was not
by the
protected
still
is
to the clear traffic,
The
processing gain inherent in the A3 mode.
does
transition process in this architecture
or
links
new
of
ment
establish
the
not involve
the reassignment of users from one mode to
another but merely the switching of the
terminal EIRP from the clear mode transmission
to the antijam mode transmission.
"Three possible responses to jamming are to
increase EIRP, reduce data rate and initiate an
antijam operating mode."
Independent of the architecture there are some
general responses that are available to the
communicator once a jammer attacks the
satellite. The possible responses include as
actions relative to the satellite as well
actions relative to the earth terminals. For
the satellite, if there is antijam spatial
processing on board, its use to reduce ertheis one
jammer power incident on the transpond at the
available response. A second response
the
satellite would be an attempt by adjusting
gain control of the transponder to keep nttheof
transponder out of saturation independe on the
the jammer EIRP. This naturally depends
particular transponder design as well as the
jammer size.
At the earth terminals there are three
responses that are apparent: an increase in
EIRP, a reduction in data rate, or the
initiation of the antijam operating mode. The
appropriate response is naturally dependent on
the specifics of the jamming attack.
From the jammer's viewpoint, there are
In
alternative strategies available as well.point
considering these strategies, the firstrealistic
and
e
legitimat
the
to realize is that
goal of the jammer is not to eliminatethethe
ability to communicate but to reduce
ability to communicate. For both communicator
and jammer, their abilities are not absolute
but relative. The jammer must make the
decision as to the strategy that minimizes they
communicator's information transfer capabilit
while requiring the commitment of a minimum
amount of resources on his part. For example,
all other things being equal, uplink jamming
has the potential of taking down multiple links
while downlink jamming takes down only one for
link. One approach that might be effective
a jammer, depending upon the design

architecture of the control process, would be
to initiate an action that causes the
communicator to transition his network. During
the transition period it is likely that
communications must be interrupted. Once the
his
network transitions, the jammer can cease
action, thus "tempting" the communicator to
reconfigure to the higher capacity network
state that existed prior to his initial will
action. If the communicator does, there which
be another interruption in traffic after is an
the jammer can repeat the process. This
oversimplified example of a potentially How
rewarding strategy open to the jammer. be is a
rewarding the strategy can be made to the
function of the requirements placed on g
control system with respect to maximizin
system capacity and the reaction time of the
entire network to control system directives.
"The realistic jammer objective is to reduce,
not eliminate, the ability to communicate."
Other alternatives available to the jammer he
include his transmission bandwidth, whether
attacks the control link or the communications
links and whether he attacks clear links only
some
or he attacks A3 links as well. There are
general considerations with respect to each of
these options.
The issue of the jammer bandwidth depends
closely on whether antijam links, whicher
nominally require the entire transpond
bandwidth, or clear links are being attacked.
In general there is no rationale for a jammer
to spread his energy across an entire more
transponder since he will then be no would be
effective against a clear link as he
against an antijam link.
With respect to attacking the control function
rather than the communications links, this is a
strategy that can potentially achieve a
jammer's objective of minimizing communications
via a minimum commitment of resources.down
Communications will eventually break
without an adequate control function and the le
control function might very well be susceptib
to a low power downlink jammer at the control
terminal.
as
The issue of attacking A3 links as well
clear links depends on the degree to which the
the
g
minimizin
to
committed
jammer is
communication capability and his abilitytheto
commit resources. It is apparent thatof success
jammer has already achieved a degree
by forcing the communicator Into an A3 that a
operating mode and it is also apparent
greater degree of jamming resources isthan was
necessary to bring down the A3 links
necessary to bring down the clear 1 inks.

Transltlonlng
The process of transltlonlng a satellite
network in response to an ECH attack is
3-5

naturally dependent on both the communications
and control architectures of the individual
network. Since it is extremely difficult to
define a general approach to network
transitioning, an example of a network
transition process will be presented for a
particular network with the following set of
characteristics:

For the remaining steps assume that the jammer
was sufficient to knock the AJ links into
reacquisition.

a.

The clear (no ECM) operating mode has all
users operating on nonprotected
communication links.

Step 4:

b.

The protected communication links operate
in the clear without traffic at a minimum
EIRP in order to minimize interference with
the clear links but sufficient to maintain
lock at each receiver.

The controller increases the EIRP for
the protected control link to a level
sufficient for all network
participants to reacqu' e the control
link.

Step 5:

In the clear the control link is a fully
protected link operating both at a minimum
data rate and minimum link margin between a
single control terminal and each of the
earth terminals that are included in the
network.

The controller now directs network
participants to abandon the clear
operating mode for the AJ operating
mode, thus allocating terminal EIRP to
the AJ links.

Step 6:

The AJ communications links between
network participants automatically
reacquire (as long as the above steps
are accomplished within the
reacquisition window).

Step 7:

The controller directs minimum
operating data rates on all AJ links
initially along with peak terminal
EIRP's if the jammer has already
driven the satellite into saturation.

Step 8:

Based upon close coordination with the
satellite controller and based also on
the output from the monitoring
process, the network controller can
attempt data rate increases on the AJ
links.

c.

d.

e.

All protected links include an automatic
reacquisition capability whereby the links
can reacquire after a loss of signal of
duration denoted as the reacquisition
window.
The monitoring capability of the control
system is located at the control terminal
and is capable of identifying and
characterizing jammers.

The transition from a non-ECM to an ECM
environment for a network with the above
characteristics wduld proceed as follows:

If the AJ links remain locked, the initial
response would appear to be a reduction in data
rate and/or an increase in EIRP for the clear
links.

Conclusions

Step 1:

An uplink jammer begins transmission

Step 2:

The clear links that are attacked lose
the capability for information
transfer and if the jammer is of
sufficient magnitude the antijam links
will lose lock also.

Step 3:

The monitoring function of the control
system identifies the presence of
jamming and must determine the
appropriate re-sponse depending on the
assessment of the jammer magnitude.

Note: If the jammer was of sufficient
magnitude to force the AJ links into
reacquisition, it is likely that a reduction in
bandwidth and/or an increase in EIRP for the
failed clear links will be of little value.
The step to be taken then is to reallocate EIRP
from clear links to AJ links.
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In summary, this paper has pointed out the
importance of network control for all satellite
communications systems. In the case of a
military satellite communications system, the
importance is compounded by the threat of an
ECM attack and the preventive measures
typically taken by the MILSATCOM system. The
control system complexity for the military
SATCOM system depends principally on the degree
to which link margins are attempted to be
reduced (network capacity increased). In one
extreme where a system is designed solely with
regard to link availability and thus with no
emphasis on system capacity, the control system
has little or no complexity. On the other
hand, when a system is designed to adapt
capacity depending on the current scenario, the
network control system and particularly the
monitoring portion of it can become extremely
complex.
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FDMA ALL USERS ARE ON ALL THE TIME
BUT ARE SEPARATED IN FREQUENCY

U3

U1
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T1

T2

T3
TDMA ALL USERS ARE ON AT DIFFERENT TIMES
BUT WHEN ON UTILIZE THE ENTIRE
AVAILABLE BANDWIDTH

U3

U3

U2

U2

U1

U1

CDMA ALL USERS ON ALL THE TIME AND EACH
USES THE ENTIRE BANDWIDTH
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